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Summary: The issues of nationalism, ethnic affiliation and political myths 
related to them continue to represent an inexhaustible sociological, political 
science and security issue in the 21st century in the same way as in the 
previous century. In their complex nature these issues appear as topics of 
many debates and interpretations, but these debates are often ideological in 
their contents. This is also confirmed by the interpretations of the events at 
the end of 20th century when the Balkan part of Europe became an area of the 
collapse of law and order, the creation of new states and alliances, national 
and religious extremism, ethnic conflicts and ethnic cleansing, as well as the 
incapability of the UN to solve the bloody local conflicts. 
This paper attempts to show the roots of nationalism and national conflicts in 
the Western Balkan political area in the course of the last decade of the last 
century. At the same time the field of analysis is directed towards the 
functional dimension of political myths and stereotypes in the subsequent 
political consolidation of newly created national identities explained at the 
examples of nationalism and antinationalism within the context of 
origination of synthetic nations at the territory of the former Yugoslavia. 
Key words: conflicts, nationalism, antinationalism, political myths, 
stereotypes, Serbia, Croatia. 
1. Introduction – about Nationalism and National Conflicts, 
Stereotypes 
Integration and disintegration are dominant processes that mark the 
development of human civilization and the future at the intersection of two 
millennia. While the integration involves processes of globalisation and 
democratisation, the disintegration refers to the collapse of sovereign states, the 
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emergence of parochialism and as a consequence tribalism mythomania and 
stereotypes related to the growing ethnic nationalism1. Therefore, nationalism 
emerges as the most powerful movement in today’s world, a movement that exceeds 
the boundaries of many social systems. (Gardels, 1991) 
That nationalism is a potential security threat, there is the fact that after 
World War II, the multi-ethnic states often fought civil wars caused by ethnic and 
racial hatred in which millions of people were killed, to confirm it (Kegl, Wittkof, 
2002). 90% of all the killed were not combatants, they were mostly unarmed 
civilians, women and children which shows the extremism in these conflicts. 
(Sivard, 1999). 
The danger of national extremism, ethnic conflict and violence in the twenty-
first century, and assess Kegl and Vitkof, stood over the whole world. Mankind lives 
in fear of terrorist aggression against neighbouring states, and even aggression 
against their own government that is prone to discrimination against its citizens 
because of their nationality or religion. National and international security will not 
be easy to reach even in the XXI century. Millions of people are victims of 
aggression, and even millions of them have been forced to go into exile.2 
Hence, the most important national conflicts in recent history are social 
conflicts whether the interstate or internal conflicts are in question. In its 
devastating force, present violence and consequences, they represent the most 
serious forms of confrontation between social groups. Their dynamics and outcome 
often culminate in war confrontations, mass casualties, and crimes committed in 
the name of national goals and interests. National conflicts are directly related to 
nationalism as an ideology, policy and doctrine to prepare and justify them. 
However, one should mention that nations and national issue, besides their 
historical, structural and social rootedness can also produce as a kind of important 
“strategic and political goods and currency in the struggle for planetary dominance 
and the redistribution of world power” (Vidojević, 1993). Therefore, national 
conflicts are far from their extinction, as seen in the planetary scale and scope of 
multinational companies taken separately. After 1989, for which some assume that 
means “the end of history” there was a sort of “re-birth of geography” according to 
which it was claimed that the world relations are much more influenced by deep 
ethnic and cultural differences clearly divided by regions than under the influence 
of powerful political or ideological factors. (Bracewell, Durres, 1999).  
National conflicts have their conceptual, ideological and political preparation 
that creates an authoritarian government, populist leaders, the circle of extreme 
right-wing intellectuals close to the authorities and parts of the clergy. Wider social 
                                                          
1 Nye, JSJr., Believes that these processes converge to transnationalism and nationalism – two competing forces 
in the world after the Cold War. Understanding International Conflicts Affairs, Longman, New York, 2002. 
2 Between 1945 and 1981, there were 258 cases of ethnic wars. In early 2002, the world’s 35 civil wars were 
raging with ethnic background, either due to the efforts of minority ethnic groups to establish an independent state or 
because of failed states policy of national government collapsed and produced a conflict of rival ethnic militias and 
paramilitary. It is estimated that approximately 26,759.000 refugees fled from 50 ethnonational conflicts that have been 
led in 1993–1994 to each of them there was an average of 80,000 killed. Kegley, CW Jr., Raymond, GA: Exorcising the 
Ghost of Westphalia: Building World Order in the New Millennium, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002, p.575. 
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basis of national conflicts are serious economic and social crisis, and sharp political 
conflict among classes and within classes, mass poverty, social and state 
disintegration. However, such a surface is not always sufficient for the development 
of inter-ethnic conflicts. Their occurrence in a society requires certain social and 
psychological background. So, national conflicts arise largely from a state of 
“collective spirit of a nation that is produced and marked by defeat or destruction of 
the traditional humanistic values as well as the loss of detailed marks of its own 
identity and morality. From such a spiritual climate, the authoritarian social 
consciousness is arisen, social majority, psychology of nihilism and all the 
permissions where force is replaced by the right” (Vidojević, 2006). And the 
authoritarian conscience becomes not only the base, solid base and a companion, 
but a necessary factor in national conflicts, nationalism and national chauvinism. 
Such a spiritual and social climate in particular are characterized by “people and 
‘not before hot’ nations” of the Balkan cultural and political circles, who have in the 
last decade of the twentieth century, as well as half a century earlier, set up their 
principles through a national, “blood and soil” ethnic cleansing . 
2. Nationalism and political myths 
Research (from political science and general security point of view) of 
mythological areas of social consciousness and cultural patterns soaked with myth 
content has always presented an interesting scientific engagement and effort of 
penetration of the tough and resistant tissue of mythological plays and patterns. 
This effort is especially difficult when political mythology is researched, because it is 
for its vital and existential capacity eternal “living” and active play about selves, our 
collective destiny, a place on the stage world history identity, historical task and 
religious mission to be processed, the “sanctity” of the space to be saved, about a 
dangerous enemy who threatens us and many other more or less commonplace in 
the political mythology of every nation (the nation). 
Unlike theogony myths, or myths of cosmogony or of anthropological 
character, which thematise divine, cosmological or anthropological dimensions of 
human existence, political myths tend to shape the value system and beliefs of 
people, their perception of the political system, social relations that govern it, the 
character of state, political authority, hierarchy of power, the nature of political 
power, membership of national identity and the like. Political myths play a 
particularly important role in creating a political base, the basis of creation and the 
establishment of a political community. These so-called founding myths become 
such an indispensable part of any awareness of the constitution of every national 
political system regardless of its size and character. In layered structure of political 
culture and culture in general myths are the main base and prototype of political 
myths are so-called founding myths, that is, myths of origin and the rise of certain 
state and political community. Without the founding myths no political culture is 
completed, nor can the state itself be more firmly established by an ideological point 
of view and beliefs of its members (Matic, 1998). 
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Scientific research of political mythology must come from the need to 
investigate and to present the position of the political ideology behind political myths 
(in particular it is important today in modern times when the importance of political 
ideology has become so large and the consequences of their practical activities in 
many cases devastating), its need to build a perception of political reality and enrich 
mythological plays and their own ideological messages to make accessible for a 
number of political consumers, creating a false consciousness that their new 
ideological content is already known and accepted. There is often religious 
phenomenon hidden behind ideological content, which at first glance seems benign 
and distant from the ideological sphere calculation. “If we look at the matter from the 
historical perspective of the twentieth century as a century of ideological wars, we can 
say that “the miracle” in Medjugorje encouraged both Croatian nationalism and anti-
Communist struggle. It appeared soon after Tito’s death, on the territory which was 
the stronghold of anti-communist and ethno-nationalist, the Axis supporters from 
the time of the Second World War” (Peric, 2006). 
Our study of political myths in the former Yugoslavia, especially those related 
to the Serbian political mythologisation, will try to point out one dimension of 
political myths, which in its (manipulative) basis wants to distort more than to hide 
some important facts from the political reality and especially the political history of 
Serbs. But the function of political myths that was observed by Ernst Kasirer and 
that is about their pragmatic role to strengthen social solidarity, make a community 
stable, particularly to establish its cracked and historical continuity which was 
politically difficult and continuous task of several generations back for the Serbs. 
Also, “Kasirer (Cassirer) in his analysis of the techniques of modern political myths 
clearly pointed out the fact that political myths are the fruits of imagination to grow 
freely.” These are artificial products created by very skilled and cunning 
craftsmen… (Matic, 1998 ).  
We will point out the political dimension of the seductive mythology, which 
can easily establish a personal relationship over bribery and consumer, for its 
emotional dimension, which makes imaginative mythological thinking and 
drinking as opposed to the strict forms of discipline and dry rational thinking. For 
all of dramaturgy, which brings the mythical stories, the simplified representation of 
the conflict of good (to me) and evil (the other), order (order) and chaos 
(opposition) divine (own religious-confessional form), and demonic forces (other 
religious and confessional form), friends and enemies (opponents). “That’s what is 
best evidenced by the fact that the use of myth in ideological and political sphere is 
still showing as a means of most existence funds of functionalism and 
instrumentation of human behavior. Myth here can constantly change, transform 
and adapt and that just because it remains the same, eternal” (Tripković 2006). 
For sociologists, historians, political scientists, anthropologists, myth is 
almost always the story of the past. Insufficiently precise and accurate but consistent 
with the needs of today by interpreters, designs, builds and is sympathetic. Myth is 
the story of how this reality was created, why it is so important to our lives, and why 
you should accept it as your own. Political myth is all listed, but even more than 
[4] NBP • Žurnal za kriminalistiku i pravo 
 POLITICAL MYTH OF NATIONALISM AND ANTINATIONALISM… 
that, it imagined an upgrade, biased and inaccurate observation of reality and 
history. The myth is paraphrase F. Fire, contamination of the past needs of our 
reality, but also the vision of today’s polished image of the “heroic” past. “As 
religious myths, political myths also have a characteristic fluidity – impermanence, 
the changing, flexibility, limit, their content is vague and subject to change. What is 
a relatively stable characteristics of the functional incorporated, is the ability to 
maintain their usefulness and timeliness. Neither the internal contradiction of 
meaning and incoherent can harm their credibility. Even the issue of conspiracy is 
not only negative: for a counterweight to the holy of cabal to devils plot. If there are 
threatening powers of darkness, there is darkness that is protective: the sons of night 
lights often choose to lead their fight. It seems that a response to a conspiracy can be 
another conspiracy” (Girard, 2000).  
Knowledge on the use and abuse of religious myths for the regime of 
nationalism in the former Yugoslavia has almost become commonplace in social 
science. We should, however, point out the connection (the fact) because it is widely 
used for daily political purposes, often at the symbolic level as a part of the 
propaganda war in the field of arts and culture (film, music, painting, etc.). “After 
winning the elections in 1990, the nationalist regime in Croatia exploited the 
popularity of the Medjugorje cult. In 1995 a movie titled Our Lady was recorded in 
the Croatian-American co-production directed by Jakov Sedlar, the official 
propagandist of the regime in Croatia. (...) The Croats were presented in the film as 
devoted Catholics and peaceful people, eager to join the western democratic world, 
but that was prevented by the Orthodox Serbs and communists” (Peric, 2006). 
The collective anxiety of the community for its existence is in deep mythic 
structures of each performance. Myths thrive in turbulent times, when historical 
events accelerate, when the collapse is not only in political and economic framework 
of the life of a political community but also the ideology that held it together and 
was often represented only by connective tissue that permeated the structure of the 
entire national community enlarged with its own contradictions. The area of the 
former Yugoslavia was a fertile ground for the development and being of various 
myths. The former Yugoslavia was a complex and contradictory structure – 
historical, cultural, religious, confessional, national, state, legal, economic, political, 
linguistic, etc. – this fact made it possible for mythologization to never stop, if there 
is something in the region that had its continuity it is certainly that of pacifism (of 
mithology) a practice that has fed the political and cultural differences maintaining 
a small community “awake and together”. And during the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
and after it, this area has still been burdened with the mythical vision of reality; it is 
in direct proportion to the amount of the deficit which burdened the newly formed 
small communities. This is the deficit of civic political personality, continuity of 
legal and political sovereignty, economic development, civil political culture, 
democratic pluralism, rule of law, individual perspectives of identity, religious and 
confessional tolerance, ethnic tolerance and cultural, linguistic-language con-
struction and the like.  
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So this is probably why the rare attempts to demystify one’s own political 
reality that come with the elementary stage of calm or volatile political ground in 
this region, infamously ended without any tangible results. As to any attempt of 
rational demystification of the current political reality and the past, there is fierce 
resistance and even some new mythical processes. To any such attempt descends 
the avalanche of new myths as if it never reached the end. And successes need 
myths, and just as good nice for defeat, and neutralize the collective feelings of guilt. 
3. Nationalism and Antinationalism – Serbia and Croatia as a 
paradigm 
In retrospective representation of their own history (and historiography), the 
Serbs often show themselves as victims of history. ”However, the concept of 
martyrdom nation is not resorted only by the Serbs but also by the Croats and the 
Bosnian Muslims”(Perica, 2006). How this myth is widespread among the Serbs is 
contributed by the fact that it did not let the roots only among the people and folk 
epic tradition, but in scientific circles as well. One part of the Serbian social sciences 
and the Serbian academics was inclined to reproduce this myth, and feeds it to new 
examples of Serbian suffering both in historical perspective as well as current events 
of that period (1990s). To illustrate just one short clip from the prevailing attitudes 
of Serbian academics at the time: “The trouble in which the Serbian people is today 
is a deeply upsetting confirmation of our repeated and useless sufferings for 
freedom in this century. The only difference is that our present calamity is much 
more ominous and much more hopeless than all the previous ones, since the sky 
above us has never before been emptier than it is today. The world in which we live 
has long been caught by frantic devastation, so it is a real wonder that there is still 
any life left in it. This is why this suffering should not affect us that much so that we 
fail to see much greater and worse trouble in which all nowadays wretched Europe 
is, which would like to punish us savagely under the knout of America because of 
our courage to oppose it.” (Djuric, 2003). Such examples were particularly 
characteristic of the period of the former Yugoslavia, but then it was the play of the 
Serbs as victims of Bolshevik-Communist ideology, of personification form the Tito 
regime in power. 
There is a similar performance in Croatia of a modern version of the 20th 
century history. This image is often adjusted to the needs of the current government 
both as a justification for breaking the then state-political community and for the 
legitimization of political regime and the emerging emphasis on national peculiarities 
of new synthetic identity. “View from the Balkans shows that they are not new, they 
are also, or perhaps above all ‘most modern’ and that the modernist project of creating 
national states still plays an important role in the word“ (Dejzing, 2005). Although 
delayed, and according to the Western models (national state in the West were 
formed back in the nineteenth century), the newly-formed state in the former 
Yugoslavia expressed a high degree of political enthusiasm in order to establish a new 
national identities and give them a clear state and institutional support. 
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Dominant myths – stereotypes, which were used by the Serbian political 
regime of 1990s at the height of war conflicts and the civil war in the territory of 
former Yugoslavia, had been theses about the Serbs as historically and politically 
scattered people looking for their gathering and the place that belongs them as the 
most numerous people in this area. There was also the thesis highlighted of the so-
called political and economic inequality of the Serbian people in the former 
Yugoslavia (Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences). There 
was then the stand of political ingratitude and incorrectness of other former 
Yugoslav nations for the victims which Serbia and the Serbian people suffered in 
both wars (I and II world war) for the creation of the Yugoslav state. “Ever since the 
beginning of the Yugoslav state, the historical farce was played the scenario of which 
was perfectly described by the old Slovenian clericalist Korošec in his words 
testifying about thoughts of the creation of the ‘common state for specific purposes’: 
We got on a good horse, and we’ll return them a worn-out horse.” (Matic, 1998). 
Political myth of the so-called Greater Serbia and a number of political 
mystification and ugly, ugly interpretation of “Načertanije” as the Greater Serbia’s 
national program, which expanded and promoted both one part of the extremely 
right-wing political parties in Serbia, and the political propaganda of the opposing 
sides, even one part of the media in the West, in order to get the media war in this 
region. Here are two typical examples: 1) ”Negative connotations related to the 
myth of a Greater Serbia was decisively contributed by the Habsburg monarchy, 
Vatican and Germany, giving explicitly aggressive dimension to the expression 
(Great Serbian), colored by the symbols of force and militant seizures (Great 
Serbian hegemony). (Jevtovic, 2008) 2) “New Croatian historiography portrayed the 
Serbs as a belligerent nation whose leaders forged a secret plan of genocide against 
the neighboring nations back in 1840s” (Perica, 2006). The thesis of deliberate 
Serbian national and state disintegration should be added to that series of unrealistic 
political mystification on the Serbian side (the existence of two autonomous 
provinces within Serbia, and in particular the problem of Kosovo and Metohija), as 
well as the projected plot of Tito’s regime for state-legal chaos in Serbia. 
On the list of political regime-constructed myths the myth of the Serbs as 
heavenly people takes the most prominent place. In those pre-war and war times 
the Kosovo myth was also encouraged. This myth is – as a part of the cultural, 
historical and ethical identity of the Serbian people – was roughly displaced from its 
epic and religious-historical context, and moved into the field of the darkest 
propaganda abuse. This myth was so misused that not only some newly created war 
commanders and politicians compared themselves with the Kosovo heroes but also 
the people from the underworld who had rather an obscure past. 
“Like their counterparts in Serbia the Croatian nationalists of various colours 
resorted to religious, Catholic and rural romantic motifs, although the latter were 
not exaggerated, because the Croats at the same time wanted to be modern, the real 
Europeans. Tuđman’s government developed a discourse within which the 
Croatian was constituted in opposition to others, primarily to the Serbs/Yugoslavs 
who hinder the true development of the Croatian people.” (Jansen, 2005) “Adhering 
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to the political amnesia, which was already perfected by the nationalists in other 
post-socialist countries, the Croatian nationalists interpreted the previous 
communist system as something imposed to the Croats from the outside – by the 
Serbs, in this particular case, not by the Russians. Thus, the collective nationalism 
freed the Croats from all traces of collaboration and conformity in their everyday 
life: innocent since the birth, the Croats were forced to enter into Tito’s Yugoslavia, 
which was an impossible combination of clashing cultures, where it was awful for 
them the entire time. Then the war, which is officially called the war for the 
homeland, in fact, was not only a necessary evil, which was imposed by the Serbs, 
and it will eventually lead to independence, but it was also the culmination of a 
thousand-year-long dream that was dreamt by the entire Croatian nation – dream 
of their own country. Indeed, the breakup with the Yugoslav past was radical: it was 
a specific combination of catharsis and exorcism.” (Jansen, 2005: 26) 
In the case of Serbia as well as in the case of Croatia, through political and 
historical amnesia (more precisely, a selective approach to historical facts, choosing 
those that are favourable and be silent on those which are not) the nation’s past and 
present, and each individual members of the nation could be reformulated so that it 
is in harmony with the new political and nationalistic practices of the authoritarian 
regimes of both Milosevic and Tudjman. Like the system of communicating vessels 
both regimes fed their authoritarianism and autocracy by new-old political myths 
and stereotypes, helping one another to survive in power (new historiography of the 
period begins to reveal examples of active cooperation and help of the two regimes 
during the entire was conflict. Exactly the same pattern and methodology of 
political conduct in both cases was largely using the political myths and stereotypes, 
even with the same shape/content, changing only the national sign. “The Balkan 
wars of the 1990s were fought among the several united ethno-nationalist fronts and 
each of them sought statehood and nationality and each challenged the limits, 
myths and identities of the opposing group.” (Peric, 2006). 
Political exodus of the Serbs in Croatia was also linked with the political myth 
of the rectification of the so-called historical injustice on both sides. Under the 
neologism ”constitutional nationalism“ (or constitutional patriotism), which was 
supposed to be a founded call to dominant national groups on both sides to square 
their national and political accounts in relation to the members of minorities on 
their respective territories, the process of ethnic cleansing went on. The researchers 
noted that ”after winning the elections, the HDZ went to work to correct what was 
considered a historical disorder. By the series of overtly or covertly discriminatory 
measures, the constitutional guarantees given to the Serbian minority soon became 
nothing but a form in the general atmosphere of retaliation, and then in violent 
conflicts, further inflamed by the propaganda of both sides. Thus, almost all the 
inhabitants of Croatian nationality were first expelled from the Serbian Krajina, a 
para-state which separated from Croatia in 1991. Then in return the Croatian army 
expelled almost all the Serbs in 1995. Neither in Serbia or in Croatia, nationalist 
discourses have remained unchanged during the war years, but the logic that existed 
in the foundation of the Croatian nationalism was to correct historical errors. War 
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operations and discriminatory measures went on together with countless examples 
of symbolic confirmations of the Croatian nation.” (Jansen 2005). 
In the report which an independent research team – led by the leaders of the 
project a historian from Belgrade, M. Bjelajac and a sociologist from Zagreb O. 
Žunec – published concerning the causes and nature of the war in Croatia 1991–
1995, on page twenty, the above thesis is confirmed that one of the main reasons for 
the revolt of the Serbs, among other reasons, was overemphasized constitutional 
nationalism of the Croatian regime. The new Constitution of the Republic of 
Croatia was fully deconstitutionalized Serbs, and turned them from an equal and 
constituent nation (legal and political status from the Constitution of the Republic 
of Croatia) into a minority, with plenty of threatening messages and symbols of 
nationalist-chauvinistic characters which aroused fears and unpleasant memories of 
the Serbs of the terrible bloodshed from the time of the Cyril NDH regime. “The 
war has often been the engine of nation-building, and it appears that the Balkans is 
no exception. In short, the war that was fought in the former Yugoslavia, and the 
processes of national homogenization and “ethnic cleansing” that followed it were, 
as it seems, primarily motivated by the need to create a simple and unambiguous 
identity of the population that is very mixed and diverse in origin, and to delete a 
mixture of elements, “pollution” and uncertainties that have hindered the newly 
created national government. It seems that violence in the former Yugoslavia at the 
end not only resulted from the opposite and incompatible identities, but to even 
greater extent, it was the means to produce them.“ (Dejzings, 2005) 
If it can be argued that the raw nationalism of the regime was at the core of 
all political regimes (referring to the territory of former Yugoslavia) and their 
political programs of separation, then it can be vouched for the anti-nationalist 
movements and practices in both Serbia and Croatia that culture – urban culture 
was put into the foundations of their “political alternatives” nationalism regime 
(”culture” was collectively sanctioned construction contrary to ”non-culture” of 
primitive natio–nalism). Political alternatives were built on the attitude of 
opposing and conflicting of rural and urban principles, while according to their 
understanding the rural should be recognized as primitive, oriental, behindhand, 
violent, and urban as cultural, progressive, modern, and non-violent. Therefore, 
the same mechanism of political mystification and the use of stereotypes were 
hiding in both theory and practice of anti-nationalist movements or more pre-
cisely, of civil initiatives of this type, as well as in the methodology of the natio-
nalism of the regime. The statement of the anti-nationalists that the regime of 
nationalism had the largest number of supporters in rural and suburban areas, 
with less educated population is true, but it is also true that a large part of urban 
population was filled with strong nationalist feelings and attitudes. To build the 
anti-nationalist alternative on urban – rural dichotomy, i.e. cultural – noncultural 
is not only politically wrong but also ethically unfair. 
The Western analyst, Stef Jansen gives evidence of this political 
misconception and the inclination to mythologization and stereotypes of the Post 
Yugoslav anti-nationalists. “Irritated by the fact that people who are fighting against 
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discriminatory discourse which permeated their society also deal with stereotypes so 
openly, at first I tried to confront standard left-wing arguments about tolerance – 
without any success, so I had to get used slowly to the fact that some Orientalism 
directed against the farmers is an important determinant of a daily routine of many 
people who regard themselves as urban people, and that it also sometimes repre-
sents the main mechanism of anti-nationalism discourse. In fact, linking natio-
nalism and rural backwardness was perhaps the most important item in an attempt 
of the Post Yugoslav anti-nationalists to maintain the ”continuity of normality, 
especially in everyday life“ (Jansen, 2005). “In accordance with the consensus that 
reigned among urban opposition, these people blamed nationalism primarily for 
the “situation”. Such anti-nationalist interpretation has four main theses: 
1. The wars that led to the breakup of Yugoslavia were the nationalist wars, in 
which 
2. the politicians keen upon power used nationalism as a tool. 
3. Nationalism, again, is primitive, rural discourse, and 
4. massive support that the rural population gave to nationalism is a 
consequence of the peasant primitivism.” (Jansen, 2005: 113). 
In the anti-nationalist discourse a special place was taken by the criticism of 
war destruction of cities, which not only stressed its military component but rather 
the destruction of urban life and all that cities as symbols of urbanity symbolize. 
This, according to them, was an open attack on modernity and urban multiple 
nationality and multiculturalism. Belgrade anti-nationalists often pointed out that 
there was so-called urbicide, the killing and destruction of urbanity as such and not 
just the physical destruction of parts of the urban environment. “As far as the 
Croatian nationalism is concerned, it called upon rural somewhat vaguely, since it 
at the same time insisted on the integration of Croatia into modern Europe, but, on 
the other hand, rehabilitated the Catholic Church as well and its conservative-
patriarchal views, which were closer to rural population than to the population in 
towns.” (ibid., 113) “Therefore, in the cities of former Yugoslavia, the main criterion 
of social differentiation had oriental character of culture, urbanity, Europe, 
cosmopolitanism, the West, knowledge, manners and civility on the one – no 
culture, rurality, region, provincial, underdevelopment, backwardness, primitivism 
and the impoliteness on the other hand.” (Ibid., 117) The anti-nationalist discourse 
in former Yugoslavia, the same stereotypes that have been heard in one part of the 
Western media and publicity war against the Milosevic regime in power were being 
repeated, and they related to the notions of Balkan, Oriental, Bolshevik-communist 
and the like. 
How much the urban-rural dichotomy was exploited is also supported by the 
fact that despite the fury of the conflict and strong nationalist homogenization that 
has dominated the warring societies in those years, the members of anti-nationalist 
initiatives used the slogans that implied a higher degree of solidarity with the rival 
nation if before the war its members belonged to the urban part of the population, 
as opposed to rural population of their ethnic groups. In Zagreb, there appeared the 
slogan ”Return us our Serbs, we are giving back your Herzegovinians.“ In this urban 
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segment, Zagreb and Belgrade were the cities which mafia of newly-come peasants 
held under the political and economic occupation and imposed their own primitive 
nationalism. Thus, we come to cultural factors in the idea of invasion: to the assault 
of primitive people on the ”culture“ of everyday urban life. (Ibid., 122nd) 
In those years the Serbian antinationalists brought back in the memory of a 
town man the book written by R. Konstatinović “The Small-Town Philosophy” 
using it as a favorite reading for explaining how the character of the current 
government, as well as the nature of the petty-bourgeois mentality that dominated 
in small urban units (small towns) of Serbia according to them. “The Small-Town 
Philosophy” in their interpretations was the extension of the rule of Orientalism, 
traditionalism and authoritarianism that was characteristic of the Balkan man. 
Political myths and stereotypes of the Post Yugoslavian anti-nationalism were thus 
built on the belief in modernity and culture, the principle of urban citizenship that is 
in counter-position to rural and patriarchal which carry the mentality of a subject. 
4. Post-Yugoslavian National Stereotypes and Myths 
Political myths and stereotypes about the clash of urban and rural principles 
(pattern) were valid not only for the manifest part of the nationalist struggle and 
anti-nationalism within a nation – state. They were often used in real everyday 
conflicts of two nationalisms, Serbian and Croatian, in particular in the sphere of 
media and political propaganda war of the two authoritarian regimes. “Tudjman’s 
nationalists represented Croatia as a bulwark of European modernity that was 
infested by the Serbian barbarians, but in addition, as we have seen, and the former 
Yugoslav state was also represented as a Balkan creation imposed to the Croats by 
the Serbs. The Orientalist definition of Croatianship as something that is opposite to 
the Balkans Serbian or to Yugoslav was a repeated story of Tudjman’s regime. (...) 
The Balkans was made equal to Yugoslavia, with Serbia or just with all that was 
non-European, not modern, uncivilized. (...) The Balkans Cinema in Zagreb 
changed its name into Europe.” (Ibid., 134) However, it is worthwhile to point out 
some differences that existed in the use of these stereotypes and political mytho-
logisation. While this method was popular in Serbia within the circle of the anti-
nationalists, in Croatia it worked equally well in both nationalist and anti-natio-
nalist circles. The conflict of Balkan and European principles was brought to 
absurdity and enabled its heirs the supposed and desirable identification both before 
their own supporters and the foreign factors for the favor and patronage of whom 
they fought desperately and flatteringly both the nationalists and anti-nationalists, 
almost equally. 
The stated nonsense of the stereotypes described is supplemented by another, 
and it is connected to the presumed poor educational structure of the rural popu–
lation. In addition to all the bad characteristics they were attributed illiteracy and 
low educational level as dominant social characteristics. “Then the man really does 
not need to be imaginative in order to conclud that nationalism was so popular 
because it enjoyed the support of old, illiterate and uncultivated farmers.” (Ibid., 
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147) Therefore, Stef Jansen has the right when he makes a conclusion about the 
essence and character of anti-nationalism movement at the post-Yugoslavian 
territory with almost ironical tone: “Ultimately, it is not clear at all and does not 
matter much whether this town of self-aware, educated, European and civilized 
people has ever existed. It is important to comment on a painful “situation” in 
which everything turned upside down. That is how the man could partially main-
tain the sense of continuity of the story of himself. You could always say ’All right, it 
is true that my town is occupied by peasants, but I have remained urban‘ or ’Well, 
the world around us may be balkanized, but I am still a European’, and then ‘Well, it 
is true that primitivism is all around me, but I have remained cultured’.” (Ibid., 166) 
The myth of one’s own belonging to culture and civilization, as opposed to rural 
primitiveness of the nationalists, was as effective on their successors as their unfo-
unded belief that they are the holders of progress and modernity. Fighting against 
one type of mythologization and misuse of myths for political purposes, the anti-
nationalists have fallen into the trap of mythologization of their own position, using 
negative stereotypes on others (peasants) and idealisation of themselves as citizens.  
Observed from the aspect of comparative analysis, post-Yugoslav natio-
nalism – both Serbian and Croatian (and this also applies to the mythological 
matrix for the other state nationalisms at the territory of former Yugoslavia), used 
abundantly the same methodological but also mythical matrix for their political and 
national objectives. In all cases, their own nation was portrayed as an innocent vic-
tim and sufferer and the opposing party as a brutal criminal and executioner. Their 
own national objectives were presented as holy and justified (often as modern and 
European) and the objectives of the rival nations as oppressive, invasive, and unjust. 
Every nation and ethnic group in former Yugoslavia had its own list (often in the 
literal sense of the word) of casualties, atrocities, destruction and injustice suffered, 
but it seems that none is able to appeal because of injuries inflicted to others. 
 In his book dedicated to Kosovo, G. Duijzingz analyzes the role of political 
and religious myths observing them in their identity perspective. At the end of the 
book, Duijzingz also mentioned the mistakes of the West when the Balkan nations 
were in question and on the part of political myths and stereotypes that the West 
produced and used in the analysis of the Yugoslav transition and war drama. The 
first problematic view according to the author is the view of the West on former 
Yugoslav conflicts as exclusively ethno-national, while he believes that the problems 
of formation and change of identity were more complex and should not be reduced 
to this level only. But what Duijzingz especially criticized the West for is the fact that 
violence and war were viewed solely as a result, backward tribal and irrational 
perspectives ascribing to political actors senseless acts contrary to Western 
rationalism and democracy. He believes that the Yugoslav war drama actors 
expressed the same political rationality as on similar occasions expressed by their 
Western counterparts, because they certainly acted within a rational paradigm of 
the modern nation-state that is in the West in the phase of its expansion of 
manufacturing the same or similar consequences. “The third message that deserves 
attention is that the violence in the Balkans should not be viewed as something 
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irrational, tribal and archaic, as something that is rooted in the culture and psyche 
of the Balkan inhabitants; in my opinion, that violence has profound rational 
dimensions and it is primarily of “European” origin: the nation-state is European 
ideal, and it is the nation-stat that was the cause of all kinds of violence, “ethnic 
cleansing” and other forms of “ethno-demographic engineering” that were applied 
in all parts of former Yugoslavia.” (Dejzing, 2005) In the opinion of this author, 
political myths do not have only a negative side and they are not characteristic for 
semi-peripheral and peripheral societies in order to compensate for the perspective 
of development, they exist in Western societies as well, even in stable and 
prosperous times creating ways and new horizons to the future developments. 
“Fertile ground for the creation of myths of nationalism should be sought in both 
European countries and the United States at the end of the 18th century, when the 
rebellious bourgeoisie that dominated the world economy, but not the government, 
needed the myth around which to gather broad masses and on which to establish a 
new faith in a new form of state.” (Gavrilovic, 2006). 
5. Instead of Conclusion 
The end of the 20th century, as well as its beginning, confirms the warning 
experience that social crises transform national emotions, myths and stereotypes of 
nationalism that are easily transformed into national-chauvinism, terror, genocide 
and war. However, renewed topicality of the “national” is not just a phenomenon of 
underdeveloped European territories at the turn of epochs but it is possible under 
the conditions of a postmodern society. (Offe, 1999) This is supported by the fact 
that in the 21st century, although there are powerful trans-national integrations in 
the field of economy, the cultural and spiritual plane is maintained and emphasizes 
ethnic particularities. These states of social awareness, E. Smith today recognizes in 
the hectic ethno-nationalist “quest for a homeland”, followed by “the most intense 
conflicts and terror”, positioning them in the broader context of “global movement 
of ethnic mobilization” or reactivation of ethno-nationalism on the planetary scale 
(Smith, 1998). 
The Balkans, in particular nation-states created on the ruins of the second 
Yugoslavia, as well as some former real socialist countries in southeastern Europe, 
starting from the fall of the Berlin Wall, were characterized by the social structure in 
which there was no entrepreneurial class or modern civil society as a dam to 
stereotypes, myths, nationalism, national chauvinism, political extremism and 
authoritarianism. From such a social structure and its properties emerges domi-
nance of “culture of violence” and glorification of violence. Violence in the name of 
“general goals”, primarily the creation of independent nation states, is spreading on 
the political psychology of all social classes and strata, as well as on rhetoric and 
political agendas of leading political parties and movements. Fascination with 
violence in the name of national historic goals or national “purity” overwhelmed 
also a circle of right-wing intellectuals who glorified it and made apology but also 
catharsis by crimes committed in the name of the nation. The crimes committed to 
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other nations or religions then get a halo of heroism and patriotism. This is where 
“nationalism in its euphoria, cruelty and militancy is transformed into chauvinism. 
This feeling can no longer be recognized at those “others” and “elsewhere”, but at all 
and everywhere” (Bozovic, 1998). It is here exactly that the roots and supports of a 
significant social-psychological phenomenon of creating an authoritarian 
charismatic leader and “father” of the nation can be found. Along with the growth 
of crisis and growing social decay the pre-political mentality and idolatry to the 
leaders of the nation grow that over time get transcendent (divine) features in the 
collective consciousness. 
Hence, the purpose of this paper is to present future and possible challenges, 
threats and dangers, since political myths and stereotypes associated with 
nationalism and national chauvinism are the culmination of a long-lasting process 
of the 19th century until today. From a general angle, the policy, obviously, has not 
completely disappeared even today, at least when it comes to Western-Balkan 
cultural and political circles. Those who survived the horrors and sacrifices of 
World War II and those who have survived the subsequent Serbia-Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo-Metohia conflicts all remember and do not have the right 
to be cheated again and to hold harmless what can end in terror, crimes and 
extermination3. Especially today, if we take into account the sharply polarized social 
structure (the ultra-rich, the poor and pauperised)4, underdeveloped institutions of 
civil society and government control. 
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POLITIČKI MIT NACIONALIZMA I ANTINACIONALIZAMA – 
IZAZOV I SAVREMENA PRETNJA BEZBEDNOSTI 
Rezime 
Pitanja nacionalizma, etničke pripadnosti i političkih mitova u vezi s njima, u 
XXI, kao i u prethodnom veku, predstavljaju neiscrpnu sociološko-politi-
kološku i bezbednosnu temu. Zbog svoje kompleksne prirode, ta pitanja se 
javljaju kao predmet brojnih rasprava i tumačenja, no, te rasprave često imaju 
ideološki sadržaj. To potvrđuju i tumačenja događaja pred kraj prošlog veka, 
kada je balkanski deo Evrope postao prostor sloma zakona i poretka, nastanka 
novih država i saveza, nacionalnog i verskog ekstremizma, etničkih sukoba i 
„etničkog čišćenja“, kao i nesposobnosti UN da reše krvave lokalne konflikte.  
U radu se nastoji ukazati na korene nacionalizma i nacionalnih konflikata u 
zapadnobalkanskom političkom prostoru tokom poslednje decenije minulog 
veka. Istovremeno, polje analize se usmerava ka funkcionalnoj dimenziji 
političkih mitova i stereotipa u naknadnoj političkoj konsolidaciji novo-
nastalih nacionalnih identiteta ekspliciranih na primerima nacionalizma i 
antinacionalizma u kontekstu nastajanja sintetičkih nacija na prostoru bivše 
Jugoslavije. 
